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Introduction
Politics and policy change are part and parcel of larger socio-technical transitions, in which established sectors such as energy supply, transport or agriculture undergo fundamental changes (Grin, 2010; Hess, 2014; Kern and Smith, 2008 ). The energy transition in Germany, for example, is closely linked to a variety of policies, including deployment subsidies for renewable energies or regulations targeting nuclear phase-out (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Strunz, 2014) . Understanding the conditions for policy change is therefore a crucial ingredient for a comprehensive theoretical perspective on socio-technical transitions (Meadowcroft, 2011; Smith and Stirling, 2007) .
This holds even more for sustainability transitions , which are fundamental and long-term transformations of large socio-technical systems guided by sustainability goals and policies. Sustainability transitions are not just purposeful but also inherently value laden and political. This means that we can expect actors having different interpretations of sustainability problems and normative struggles unfolding over the pace and directions such transitions should take (Geels and Verhees, 2011; Lawhon and Murphy, 2012; Smith and Stirling, 2010) .
Despite the crucial role of politics and policies, transition studies are just beginning to pay more attention to "the political circumstances that make the adoption of such policies likely" (Meadowcroft, 2011, p. 73) . With this paper, we respond to recent calls to strengthen research on the 'politics of transitions' (Lawhon and Murphy, 2012; Shove and Walker, 2007; . We will explore changes in advocacy coalitions as a precondition for major policy change. As we foreground actors (political parties, associations, environmental NGOs, firms) and coalitions and their role in the policy process, we also contribute to the emerging line of research on actors and agency in transitions (Farla et al., 2012) .
We draw on two strands of literature. From policy analysis, we adopt the advocacy coalition framework (ACF), which maintains that actors with similar beliefs form alliances that affect the output of the policy process (Sabatier, 2007) .
Secondly, we position this study in the literature on sustainability transition studies , which is interested in the conditions for and dynamics of far-reaching changes in socio-technical systems .
Transitions are characterized by fundamental uncertainties, which means that even the formulation of a policy problem is ambiguous and contested, let alone policy goals, strategies and expected outcomes. Policy process theories, which highlight the importance of cognition and framing, therefore seem to be particularly fruitful for transition studies (Kern, 2009) . Among the cognitive approaches, we have selected the ACF because of the underlying systems concept, its focus on actors and beliefs, and the emphasis on external shocks as key mechanism for major change, which altogether seem to provide a good match with socio-technical systems approaches in transition studies (e.g. Coenen and Diaz Lopez, 2010) .
Our empirical study centers around the transition of the energy sector towards higher shares of renewable energies, increased energy efficiency and lower demand. This 'energy transition' has caught political attention in many countries, including Switzerland. In the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Swiss government has proposed to phase-out nuclear energy (which currently accounts for up to 40% of the country's electricity generation) and to launch a fundamental reform of the energy sector. Such a far-reaching transformation requires political support from a broad range of actors over a long period of time. As of 2015 the actual process of policy making is still ongoing. So the question arises, to what extent key actors in Swiss energy policy will support such a fundamental policy change.
In the following, we study which coalitions of actors characterize the Swiss energy policy subsystem, whether and how they have changed over time and whether there are indications for policy change. Our paper is based on the analysis of consultation documents of three major energy policy processes at different points in time (2001, 2007 and 2013) . We identify relevant political actors and systematically analyze their policy beliefs.
The paper is structured as follows. Next we introduce socio-technical transitions and the ACF and develop first conceptual ideas on the interplay of policy systems and socio-technical systems. Section 3 then introduces the empirical setting and briefly reviews prior work. Section 4 presents the methods and section 5 the results. In section 6 we discuss our findings and methods. Section 7 concludes.
Theoretical background

Key concepts
A socio-technical transition is commonly understood as a fundamental transformation of a socio-technical system (e.g. Geels and Schot, 2010) . Such a transition is multi-dimensional, i.e. it encompasses technological as well as organizational, institutional and socio-cultural change. In the course of a transition, new products, services, business models, organizations, regulations, norms and user practices emerge, partly complementing but more often substituting existing ones. Historical examples of socio-technical transitions 4 include the introduction of pipe based water supply (Geels, 2005a) , the shift from cesspools to sewer systems (Geels, 2006) or from carriages to automobiles (Geels, 2005b ).
Socio-technical transitions have been analyzed with different theoretical frameworks . One of these is the multi-level perspective Geels, 2011) , which suggests that established socio-technical systems 1 are very resistant to change due to a high degree of structuration (both material and institutional), close relationships among incumbent actors and vested interests. Transitions are set in motion through a combination of external developments or shocks (e.g. nuclear accidents) at the so-called landscape level and novel technologies emerging in protected niches (Geels and Schot, 2007; Verbong et al., 2007) . As novel technologies develop and diffuse, new sociotechnical systems emerge with them. These emerging systems also include actors, networks and technology-specific institutional structures and have been referred to as technological innovation systems in the literature (Bergek, Jacobsson, Carlsson, et al., 2008; Markard and Truffer, 2008b) .
Policy change is a key process in socio-technical transitions. It is about the implementation, adaptation and discontinuation of public policies. With policies we refer to the content or substance of policy making, including objectives, programs, regulations, laws and funding priorities. When using the term public policies we refer to policies issued by a governmental entity. Policies are the answer of the political system to societal problems. Policies are often formalized and can be conceptualized as key elements of the institutional structures of socio-technical systems, next to social norms, expectations, technical standards etc.
Policies affect socio-technical systems in various ways. Technology and innovation policies contribute to the generation and diffusion of knowledge, which is vital for new technologies to emerge, while deployment policies contribute to the formation of markets and an up-scaling of novel socio-technical systems. In the ongoing energy transition in Germany, for example, a range of policies have fostered the development of renewable energy technologies such as wind or solar (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Strunz, 2014) . Conversely, policy change may also contribute to the decline of socio-technical systems -through a removal of earlier subsidies or technology bans (e.g. nuclear power in Germany, The transitions literature refers to these systems as socio-technical regimes. We will not use the term regime very much in the following because it is used differently in the political science literature. We understand a socio-technical system as an interdependent set of actors and institutional structures in a specific technological domain. 5 incandescent light bulbs in the European Union). Note that policies do not just enable but also constrain socio-technical change, for example as they reduce diversity and contribute to the creation of novel technology paths (e.g. nuclear in
France or ethanol in Brazil, cf. Solomon and Krishna, 2011) .
Politics is another essential process in socio-technical transitions (Meadowcroft, 2011) . Politics refers to the process of policy making, with a variety of state and non-state actors negotiating and interacting (Knill and Tosun, 2012) . Policies and policy change can be viewed as a result of politics. Examples for politics in the energy sector include different groups of actors struggling to legitimize and delegitimize nuclear power (Garud et al., 2010; Geels and Verhees, 2011) and to influence nuclear policy making (Nohrstedt, 2010) . Similar struggles have been reported for renewable energy policies with incumbent actors trying to prevent policy change and renewable energy proponents lobbying in favor of deployment policies (Hess, 2014; Sühlsen and Hisschemöller, 2014) . Also the Dutch transition management program has been depicted as a case in which politics, namely the strong influence of incumbent actors, prevented any major changes thus failing the original intentions (Kern, 2011; Kern and Smith, 2008) .
These examples illustrate that politics, policies and policy change are central for socio-technical transitions. In the case of sustainability transitions, the exposure to politics can be expected to be even more prominent (Lawhon and Murphy, 2012; Meadowcroft, 2011) . Sustainability transitions have been conceptualized as an intentional endeavor of socio-technical transformation, guided by public policies (Kemp and Loorbach, 2006; Voß et al., 2006) . Such a process is not just inherently value-laden but also affects a broad range of stakeholders, which win or lose depending on how the transition unfolds.
In the sustainability transitions literature, there is an emerging strand of research on the politics of transitions, where scholars have studied power and power relations (Avelino and Rotmans, 2009; Grin, 2012) , the ways in which resources are mobilized (Avelino and Rotmans, 2009 ), which language is used in political discourse (Lawhon and Murphy, 2012) , or how alliances form and accumulate around specific transition paths (Grin, 2012; Lawhon and Murphy, 2012) . A related stream of research focuses on actors and networks in transitions (Farla et al., 2012) , their strategies and interests (Bakker, 2014; Markard and Truffer, 2008a; Smink et al., 2013) or their role in the creation of novel technological fields (Konrad et al., 2012; Musiolik et al., 2012) . With our work, we contribute to both of these emerging lines of research on actors and politics in 6 transitions. More specifically, we concentrate on the identification of advocacy coalitions and changes in coalitions as an explanation for policy change. 2
Policy change and the advocacy coalition framework
In policy analysis, and more specifically in policy process theories, different frameworks have been developed to study and explain policy change (Sabatier, 2007) . These include, among others, institutional rational choice (Ostrom, 1990; Scharpf, 1997) , the punctuated-equilibrium theory (Jones and Baumgartner, 1993; True et al., 2007) and the advocacy coalitions framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier and Weible, 2007) .
In the following we concentrate on the advocacy coalition framework (ACF), which has been applied to a wide range of policy issues and policy making systems, including the US, Canada and European countries (Weible et al., 2009 ). Due to its focus on actors and their beliefs, the ACF seems to nicely resonate with the study of sustainability transitions, for which competing values, distinct views on problems and causalities, and interpretation of scientific findings are central (Lawhon and Murphy, 2012) . Given its wide range of applications, we also expect the ACF to be sufficiently general to be applied for the study of socio-technical transitions.
The ACF has a strong focus on actors and explains policy change with changes in the beliefs held by these actors (Sabatier and Weible, 2007) . It is part of the 'cognitive turn' in policy studies, which places perceptions, ideas and cognitive processes over purely interest or power based explanations (Kern, 2009; Kuebler, 2007; John, 2012) . Next, we briefly introduce the key conceptual elements of the ACF together with the assumptions on which the framework rests.
Policy participants, or actors, are "legislators, agency officials, and interest group leaders, but also researchers and journalists who specialize in [a specific] policy area … and judicial officials who regularly intervene in a policy subsystem." (Sabatier and Weible, 2007, p. 192) . Participants are considered to be experts in a specific policy field. A policy subsystem is a set of policy participants that "have sought to influence public policy in [a specific] policy domain for an extended 2 Interestingly, the term 'advocacy coalitions' already appears quite frequently in studies on socio-technical transformation, referring to groups of actors with common interests that shape discourses (Ulmanen et al., 2009) , influence political decision-making (Jacobssen and Lauber, 2006) or legitimize novel technologies Negro et al., 2008) . However, the underlying idea that shared beliefs are the basis for collective action and that these beliefs are rather resistant to change, has not been mobilized yet in the aforementioned studies.
7 period" (ibid). Policy subsystems often exist for decades. Examples of how subsystems have been defined include air pollution control in the US, steel policy in the European Union, climate change policy in Canada or health policy in the UK (Weible et al., 2009 ).
Policy actors are assumed to hold normative and causal beliefs that are difficult to change and act as filters for how information is perceived. The ACF distinguishes three hierarchical levels of actor beliefs: Deep core beliefs refer to fundamental assumptions and worldviews and are very difficult to change. Policy core beliefs are about basic positions in a policy subsystem, e.g. with regard to the role of the state or the salience and understanding of the policy issue. As they are "applications of deep core beliefs that span an entire policy subsystem" (Sabatier and Weible, 2007, p. 194) they are almost equally difficult to change. At the third level are secondary beliefs (also: secondary aspects) about specific policies to be implemented or measures to be taken within a specific subsystem.
Advocacy coalitions are groups of policy actors that share similar belief systems and engage in a "non-trivial degree of coordination": they collaborate and coordinate actions to enhance the chance that their belief systems get translated into policy outputs and objectives (Henry, 2011; Sabatier and Weible, 2007, p. 196) . It is assumed that a policy subsystem consists of 2-4 advocacy coalitions, of which one is dominant and has the most influence on policy output (Weible et al., 2009) . It is also assumed that policy core beliefs are rather stable over time, which is why coalitions -and policies -typically do not change very much.
However, policy change does occur and the ACF distinguishes minor and major policy change. Minor policy change is associated with adaptations of political programs and policy measures, while major change is about new or fundamentally different policy goals, programs and measures. Minor change is seen as a result of changes in secondary beliefs, whereas major change is a consequence of shifting core beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999) . For the ACF it is very unlikely that core beliefs change voluntarily (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 198) , which explains its emphasis on external reasons for policy change. In fact, it proposes several sources for major policy change: External shocks (e.g. larger changes in socio-economic conditions, outputs from other policy subsystems, political regime changes) can be a central source for changes in core beliefs as they redistribute resources and change policy venues. Further sources are internal shocks in the policy subsystem (e.g. environmental disasters, accidents) and negotiated agreements among different coalitions.
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Comparison of frameworks
The advocacy coalition framework and systems approaches to socio-technical change have some similarities but also differences, which we will briefly discuss below. We concentrate on the multi-level perspective (MLP). Both ACF and MLP take a systemic perspective and seek to explain major changes of configurations or structures that are typically very stable and resistant to change. Both assume that changes are long-term but the time horizon is different: major policy change is expected to take about a decade, while socio-technical transitions are assumed to take 50 years, or more. Moreover, both frameworks refer to (external) shocks as a major source of change but also highlight other processes such as learning or novelties emerging. The two frameworks also differ in their underlying explanatory mechanisms for change. The ACF has very much of a micro-foundation with its focus on actors and their beliefs (and resources and coordination). The MLP highlights technology variation and selection as core explanatory principles (Geels, 2010) .
The ACF conceptualizes the policy subsystem as a network of actors without paying much attention to broader institutional structures (e.g. taken for granted assumptions, collective expectations, socio-technical paradigms) that characterize a policy subsystem, or affect coalition building (Sabatier and Weible, 9 2007 ). The MLP in contrast very much emphasizes institutional structures, especially at the regime level. The study of actors, their resources and networks is less prominent and mostly confined to the niche level (Farla et al., 2012; Markard and Truffer, 2008b) . Against this background, the ACF seems to be an interesting complement for transition studies, strengthening the somewhat neglected view on role of actors and politics in transitions (Lawhon and Murphy, 2012) .
Interaction of policy change and socio-technical change
Below, we introduce first ideas of how changes in policy subsystems and in socio-technical systems affect each other. We conceptualize socio-technical systems and policy subsystems as overlapping systems that are linked through resource flows and 'share' certain actors. We regard the two types of systems as tightly interwoven in the sense that they co-constitute each other (Smith and Stirling, 2007) . At the same time, the systems have their own 'logics' about how they work and can exhibit independent dynamics.
We assume that actors can pursue (at least) two kinds of activities: they can contribute to policy making and they can provide services within the sociotechnical system (e.g. energy generation and distribution, technology development, knowledge creation). Of course, they also can do both. Examples for the latter are firms that apply existing or develop novel technologies and lobby for favorable regulation. Or industry associations, which provide a variety of services for their members, including political representation of their interests.
Such actors are involved in both systems.
Actors of the socio-technical system provide resources such as finances or information for actors in the policy subsystem (political parties, NGOs, associations, public administration etc.). In exchange, they receive political support, e.g. in the form of favorable regulation, subsidies or provision of legitimacy. At a systems level, we might say that a socio-technical system provides resources for the policy subsystem, while the policy subsystem delivers favorable policies (which again secure resource flows into the socio-technical system). Actors in both systems also interact as they exchange and adapt beliefs, including views about key challenges and prospects of socio-technical configurations. These views are shared among some but not all actors, which is why there is inherent conflict and struggle about dominant beliefs, policies and technologies.
In a stable situation (Figure 1a ), actors of an established socio-technical system, or regime, are well represented in the dominant advocacy coalition and there are substantial resource flows from the socio-technical system to the policy subsystem and vice versa. There is no or just incremental policy change, which means that the policy related institutional structures of the socio-technical system are maintained. Beliefs and resource endowments of actors as well as actor networks (business alliances and advocacy coalitions) do not change much.
There might be competing coalitions and alternative technologies but these play a minor role.
In an early destabilization (Figure 1b) In a phase of major policy change (Figure 1c ), the former minority coalition has gained influence due to new actors joining and existing actors changing their core beliefs. The alternative socio-technical configurations consequently receive increased political support, while favorable policies for the established sociotechnical system will be reduced or withdrawn. This leads to a destabilization of established institutional structures and a re-orientation or exit of incumbent actors.
Note that this is a simplified model of how policy change and socio-technical change are intertwined, i.e. how developments in one system feed back into the other. It does not imply that policy change is the only or primary driver for sociotechnical change, or vice versa. 3 Also note that the model seems to suggest that policy subsystems and socio-technical systems have the same boundaries (e.g. national or regional). However, socio-technical systems may well reach beyond a specific policy subsystem. In the case of the energy transition, technology development (e.g. in photovoltaics or wind energy) is simultaneously affected by multiple national policy subsystems. The socio-technical system can also be seen as a channel through which different policy subsystems indirectly interact. The energy transition is about fundamental socio-technical, organizational and institutional changes in the energy sector of a particular country or region. In many industrialized countries, the energy sector has witnessed transitions in the past 200 years (Solomon and Krishna, 2011 from wood to coal, from coal to oil, from oil to nuclear energy and natural gas.
These transitions included both, the exploitation of new primary energy sources and the development of novel energy conversion technologies (steam engine, internal combustion engine, steam turbine, nuclear reactor). Moreover, they also reached into related sectors such as industrial production, transportation, heating and electricity.
Currently, we see the beginning of another transition, in which fossil and nuclear fuels are substituted by new renewable energy technologies such as wind, solar or biomass. An important feature of the ongoing energy transition is that it is associated with societal goals (e.g. reduction of greenhouse gas emissions or nuclear risks, energy independence, regional value creation). It can therefore be viewed as an example of a sustainability transition, where public policy has a strong influence on the pace and direction of development. The German "Energiewende" with various public policies to strengthen renewable energies and energy efficiency and the political decision to phase out nuclear until 2022 is certainly a prominent example in this regard (Strunz, 2014) .
Energy transition policy in Switzerland
In Switzerland, there is a host of energy policies that range from rules for market liberalization to programs for energy conservation, subsidies for renewables and regulations for CO2 reduction. Here, we concentrate on the policy proposal of the "Energiestrategie 2050" currently under debate (EnG, 2012) . In May 2011, in the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Swiss government and parliament decided to phase-out nuclear and to stimulate energy efficiency and the use of renewable energies instead. As a consequence, the government Under the ACF, Fukushima can be interpreted as an external shock, while the governmental decision to phase out nuclear is an internal shock to the Swiss energy policy subsystem. Such events might lead to alterations of core beliefs and major policy change (see Nohrstedt, 2010; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Zafonte and Sabatier, 2001 ), although one decade or more is expected to be in between the shock and observable policy outputs (Sabatier and JenkinsSmith, 1993 ). An important pre-condition for such a change and thus interesting to study are beliefs and coalitions right after the shock. It is here where we expect important insights about the propensity for major policy change in the future.
Compared to many other European countries, the Swiss energy market is rather small with an annual energy consumption of 245 TWh, of which 24%
are accounted for by electricity, 34% by transport, 28% by heating, and 14%
by other purposes (SFOE, 2012) . Energy demand has continuously increased from 1979 to 2012 with an average of 0.85% per year, despite several measures to increase energy efficiency.
A particularity of the Swiss energy system is that the electricity sector is almost 'CO2-free' as power production is primarily from hydropower (57% on average) and nuclear (38% on average). New renewable energies still play a minor role for electricity generation with solar, wind and biomass contributing to 1.7% of the electricity production in 2013 (SFOE, 2013) . Over the past 14 years, there were no major changes in Swiss electricity generation. However, new renewables (especially solar) have seen some growth in the last five years, although they are still at very low levels compared to most other European countries.
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Prior studies on advocacy coalitions in Swiss energy policy
Coalitions in Swiss energy and climate policy have already been analyzed in prior studies. A study of three subsequent policy processes and subsystems (nuclear energy, energy efficiency, and electricity market liberalization) revealed two stable coalitions, a pro-growth and a pro-ecology coalition in Swiss energy policy from 1987 to 2000 (Jegen, 2003) . Polarization between these two coalitions was most pronounced in nuclear policy subsystem. For more recent policy processes such as market liberalization, belief differences among members of the two coalitions were more moderate and cross-coalition collaboration could be observed.
Almost one decade later, Ingold (2011) and Sutter (2011) analyzed Swiss climate policy between 1995 and 2010. They also identified two major coalitions, a proeconomy, and a pro-ecology coalition. And again they found coalitions to be very stable with not much exchange across coalition boundaries. For some political issues such as energy efficiency or adaptation to climate change, however, crosscoalition cooperation and thus a potential adaptation of otherwise contrasting policy beliefs seemed to be possible (Sutter, 2011) . Some actors like cantonal representatives, moderate parties or federal agencies might act as so-called policy brokers (Ingold and Varone, 2012; Kriesi and Jegen, 2001 ) and thus facilitate policy compromise or even policy change.
In summary, existing studies point to rather stable and polarized coalitions in the Swiss energy policy subsystem but also highlight that -depending on the actual policy issue -some actors work across coalition boundaries and may thus contribute to policy agreements.
Methods
Our analysis consisted of four steps including i) definition of scope and selection of key actors, ii) development of a belief coding scheme, iii) coding of three consultation procedures and categorization of actors and iv) identification of coalitions based on actors' belief systems. For our study we used public consultation documents. In a consultation procedure, the administration invites all interested actors to submit written statements on a particular policy proposal.
In some cases, stakeholders are even asked specific questions (cf. List 1).
Submissions vary in length: some just cover a few pages, while others contain 40 
Scope of analysis and selection of key actors
Defining the scope of a policy subsystem and selecting key actors ("policy participants") is a crucial step in the application of the ACF (Sabatier and Weible, 2007) . We started with a broad definition: The Swiss energy policy subsystem includes all actors involved in energy policy decision-making in Switzerland. This was narrowed down subsequently. Here the focus was on those actors that participate in the pre-parliamentary phase (consultation procedure).
To narrow down the number of actors, we first compiled a list of 70 organizations, which we assumed to have a high interest in the proposal. To prepare this list, we talked to experts in Swiss energy and climate policy and consulted earlier studies in the field (e.g. Ingold, 2011; Kriesi and Jegen, 2001; Sutter, 2011) . Different types of organizations were covered, including political parties, industry associations, energy associations, environmental NGOs, utility companies, commissions and universities.
Next, a shortlist was prepared following the reputational approach (French, 1969) , in which actors are included based on their perceived relevance. We contacted seven experts in the field (scientists, administration officials, consultants) and asked them to rank each of the 70 organizations in terms of relevance 5 for energy policy making in Switzerland. Experts could also add additional actors. As a result, we yielded a sample of 23 organizations that -on average -were ranked relevant or highly relevant (cf. Table 4 ). Following the positional approach (Knoke, 1993) , in which actors are selected because they hold formal decisional power or competences in the issue, we included additional actors from the housing sector, industry, commerce and transportation. Our final sample covered 41 actors divided into seven different groups (cf. Table 4 ). 
Development of coding scheme
According to Sabatier (1993) , a qualitative content analysis of publications of interest groups is a very suitable method to empirically examine policy core beliefs. To ensure a systematic and reproducible analysis we developed a category system that reflects both the applied framework and the data available.
We briefly substantiate our categories below. This seems important, as several earlier publications in this area did not explain the set-up of the categorical framework used (e.g. Elliott and Schlaepfer, 2001; Lubell, 2003; Heintz, 1988) .
We started with a list on policy core beliefs from the literature (Sabatier, 1998) .
That list was Sabatier's attempt to illustrate policy core beliefs in a concrete but general way. Besides subsystem-specific and institutional aspects, we also included the three dimensions of sustainability (environmental protection, social justice and economic efficiency). Next we tested our initial scheme with a selection of consultation documents and refined it. In particular, we split the initial categories of policy core beliefs into sub-dimensions. This bottom-up approach helped us to classify actor statements more precisely. We ended up with a list of 5 dimensions, and 18 sub-dimensions to identify policy core beliefs (cf. Table 5 ).
Secondary beliefs (cf. List 1) were derived from four questions out of the questionnaire that was part of the consultation. These questions are about specific policy goals and instruments.
Coding of beliefs and categorization of actors
To facilitate coding, we defined exemplary statements for each sub-dimension and used a four-stage ordinal scale to classify the text phrases found in the actors' consultation answers for Energy Strategy 2050 (cf. Table 6 ). In a pre-test, three submissions were coded independently by two researchers. Results were compared, coding guidelines adapted and specified. To better handle the large text quantities, we worked with MAXQDA, a computer program for qualitative data analysis.
As the two other policy proposals had a somewhat different focus, not the exact same coding scheme could be applied. For instance, the dimension of social justice had to be removed because it did not yield a sufficient number of statements.
Also note that not all actors made submissions to all three proposals, some 
Identification of coalitions
To identify coalitions, we pursued the following steps. First a matrix was created with one row for each actor and one column for all 18 core and four secondary beliefs. Each cell was then filled with a number between 1 and 4 (Table 6) indicating varying levels of agreement with the respective belief dimension.
Second, a Manhattan Distance Analysis was conducted to transform this "actor vs. belief" matrix into an "actor vs. actor" matrix, where every cell indicates the distance in belief attribution between two actors. Third, clustering of actors was carried out with the Tabu Search Clustering approach. To assess the optimal number of clusters, Tabu Search Clustering provides a relative goodness of fit (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). In our case, the most robust results were produced by a split of the subsystem into two clusters, i.e. two coalitions. By using multidimensional scaling the distances of all actors can finally be illustrated graphically in two-dimensional maps (cf. section 5).
Results
In this section we first present our results from the Energy Strategy 2050 consultation, in terms of both policy core beliefs and secondary aspects. In a second step, we compare the current actor base, policy core beliefs and coalitions with those of the two earlier policy processes.
Energy Strategy 2050 Analysis of policy core beliefs
Our analysis shows that the policy core beliefs of the key actors in the Swiss energy policy subsystem of 2013 are distributed heterogeneously (cf. Figure 2 ).
There are two coalitions emerging from the cluster analysis. A larger group of actors (1) encircled on the bottom-right part of the graph, and a smaller one on the left side (2).
Group 1 encompasses mid-and right-wing parties, 'classical' industry associations such as Economiesuisse, energy associations and the large Swiss utility companies (cf. Table 2 ). Group 2 consists of three green and left-wing parties, the Swiss Federation of Trade Unions (SGB), a clean-technology industry association (Swisscleantech), the major environmental NGOs and two renewable energy associations. In the following, we will refer to the first group as "proeconomy" coalition and to the second as "pro ecology" coalition. 6 6 These labels are proxies for the dominant beliefs in the two coalitions and chosen in accordance with earlier studies (e.g. Ingold 2011) . It has to be noted though that the
Figure 2: EnStrat 2013 -Relative distances of actors in terms of policy core beliefs
Although there are belief differences within each coalition, we could identify some common threads in each of the five dimensions of our category system (cf. In terms of social impacts, pro-ecology actors claim that energy must be affordable for everyone (with the households in mind), while pro-economy actors are more occupied with broad public legitimation for energy policy.
While the general differences are remarkable, belief distances between specific pro-ecology and pro-economy actors are in some cases much smaller. The Electric Utility of Zurich (ewz) and the Swiss Association of the Gas Industry "The CVP considers the phase-out of nuclear energy and the related expansion of energy generation from renewable, domestic energy sources an opportunity for Switzerland. With [this kind of] energy generation the regional economy can be strengthened and jobs can be created." CVP 2013 
Analysis of secondary beliefs
With regard to secondary aspects we compared whether the actors are in favor of nuclear phase-out and support targets for renewables, energy efficiency and energy demand (cf. List 1). Here the picture is very much different compared to what we saw for policy core beliefs (Figure 3 ). 7 We find that most organizations support the new policy objectives. Interestingly, even actors that -in terms of policy core beliefs -are part of the pro-economy show various levels of consent. This includes electricity sector players such as EWZ, Swisspower and BKW as well as CVP, the Swiss association of small and medium enterprises (SGV), ETH and the Swiss mountain cantons. The statement of BKW, one of the Swiss nuclear power plant operators, illustrates how cautiously nuclear proponents argued in 2013.
"After the events in Japan, it is clear for BKW that the substitution of … Swiss nuclear power plants cannot take place with nuclear power plants of present-day technology. BKW can therefore understand the political will to ban the construction of new nuclear power plants. … However, a legally consolidated technology ban for nuclear energy based solutions has to be rejected." BKW 2013 7
Note that we do not refer to coalitions in this part of the analysis because this term is exclusively used for differentiation on the basis of policy core beliefs.
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The analysis also shows that the positions of those in favor of the propositions are widespread, while most opponents express identical secondary beliefs. This might make it easier for the opponents to join forces against the proposal. 
Changes in advocacy coalitions
We distinguish two types of change, changes in the actor base and changes in Some of these changes (foundation of new parties) were largely independent of the developments in the energy sector, while others were not. Market liberalization has led to mergers, new alliances and a diversion of interests in the electricity sector. For utilities with a focus on distribution, the energy transition seems to represent less of a threat than for power producers (esp. those invested in nuclear energy). The foundation of Swisscleantech is related to an even broader phenomenon, the rise and increasing impact of eco-oriented products and services. 9 These are often related to energy but also go beyond it.
Changes in core beliefs and coalitions
In all three policy consultations, the pro-economy coalition (1) In March 2013, the Swiss government has launched a set of instruments to foster green consumption and a circular flow economy ("action plan green economy").
10 Note that the size of a coalition is not a sufficient indicator to determine its actual influence on the policy process. See also related comment on resources in section 6.2.
11 It has to be noted though that a direct comparison of actor positions and average distances over time is somewhat limited because the overall number of actors we could include in our analysis varied. This is due to data availability and changes in the actor base.
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Figure 4: EMD 2001 -Relative distances of actors in terms of policy core beliefs
We also found that three pro-economy actors, the Swiss Academy of Sciences (AkadWiss), the municipal utility of Zurich (EWZ) and the Christian Democratic 
Summary of findings
The Swiss energy policy subsystem is characterized by two coalitions: A larger group of key actors ("pro-economy") tend to give priority to low energy prices and rather oppose regulatory intervention, while a smaller group of actors ("proecology") highlight the importance of environmental and climate protection and the necessity of public policies towards these goals. Over a period of 13 years, the two coalitions have remained very stable and policy core beliefs of the key actors have not changed very much.
However, the spectrum of policy core beliefs has increased: Positions back in The dominant, conservative coalition included incumbent actors of the energy sector and their representatives. This is in line with our initial conceptual ideas (Figure 1a, b) and with studies from other countries that found energy incumbents rather lobbying against major policy changes (Kern and Smith, 2008; Stenzel and Frenzel, 2008) . However, we also saw that incumbents are not necessarily united in their positions. Three incumbent players (EWZ, BKW and Swisspower) were in favor of several of the proposed policy changes in 2013. EWZ is the largest municipal utility and Swisspower is a joint venture of 23 municipal utilities. So it seems that some incumbents also see opportunities rather than risks in the energy transition.
Given the observed stability of Swiss energy policy coalitions, it might come as a surprise that secondary beliefs are in favor of policy change and many key actors today support nuclear phase-out and an expansion of renewables by means of regulation. Following the theoretical assumptions of the ACF, we can expect that the Fukushima shock has played a major role in here. This is particularly important as nuclear has been one of the most contested energy policy issues in Switzerland in the past, with very polarized views and a strong advocacy coalition in favor of its continued use (Jegen, 2003) . Today, views on nuclear and renewables are obviously changing. Even actors, who hold essentially conservative policy core beliefs, meanwhile express doubts on nuclear and see economic potential in alternatives (see earlier statement of CVP).
But how can we explain the apparent contradiction of secondary and policy core beliefs? In addition to environmental issues, the energy transition is meanwhile associated with arguments about job creation, regional value creation and independence of energy imports. Such arguments fit very nicely to conservative policy core beliefs but are also mobilized by pro-ecology actors. This means that the policy issue (energy transition) has outgrown the traditional lines of conflict between environmental and economic values. In fact, it seems that the substance and perception of the policy issue have shifted as renewables became more mature and economically viable and nuclear has lost some of its earlier 26 legitimacy. Such a (gradual) shift in the policy issue would be very much in line with findings from the German energy transition, where it was argued that the dramatic political turnaround in 2011 was only possible due to a long period of experiences with and continued performance improvements of renewable energies (Strunz, 2014) .
A second, related explanation is about changes in the actor basis. Our study showed that in 2013 the pro-ecology coalition included three major industry associations (AEE, Swissolar and Swisscleantech). This coalition, in other words, is not just constituted by left-wing parties and environmentalists but also accommodates for a new type of industry actors. There is a range of industries such as clean-tech, energy efficiency, energy services, solar or wind whose members expect to benefit from the ongoing energy transition, which is why they are in favor of stringent transition policies. As a consequence, the underlying actor basis shifts both in the policy system and in the newly emerging sociotechnical system (cf. Figure 1) . Meanwhile, the energy transition has become not just a struggle of environmental vs. economic interests but of emerging vs.
established industries, and who will win or lose.
Methodological challenges
One motivation for our study was to explore how established methods for analyzing coalitions in policy subsystems can inform transition studies. The systematic identification of key actors, their policy core and secondary beliefs has helped us to make major lines of political conflict transparent (Table 3) , to detect typical arguments, to discover potential boundary-spanning actors and to draw conclusions on further developments in the field. In our analysis, however, we encountered some methodological and conceptual challenges that deserve consideration in further research.
Actual influence on policy process
While we could point to the numbers of key actors in each coalition this tells us little about what resources the different actors can mobilize and what influence the coalitions have on the final policy output (Stokman and van den Bos, 1992) .
Further research will therefore benefit from systematic analyses of power (Avelino and Rotmans, 2009) , coordination among actors (Henry, 2011; Ingold, 2011; Ingold and Fischer, 2014; ) and of the resources actors control (Sabatier and Weible, 2007) . The latter include formal decision-making power, access to political venues, financial resources, social ties, legitimacy etc. In the case of political parties, for example, one could use seats in parliament or voting shares as proxies for political influence. Another possibility is to look into the financial resources different coalitions have available (cf. Hess, 2014) or into relationships they maintain with formal decision-makers (Beyers and Braun 2013). Combining investigations of beliefs and resources seems also promising as it adds material aspects to ideational explanations of the policy process.
Study of cooperation and resource flows
In this study we identified coalitions on the basis of belief similarity. We did not venture into examining actual collaboration among actors. Although previous work (cf . Henry, 2011; Ingold and Fischer, 2014; Weible and Sabatier, 2005) has shown that policy core beliefs typically exhibit a strong overlap with collaboration (e.g. information exchange, joining forces, alignment of positions), we could not demonstrate this for the case at hand. Further research may want to explore alternative measures on both the existence of coalitions and the collaboration of actors within advocacy coalitions and other types of alliances such as innovation networks (Musiolik and Markard, 2011) . It is especially the building of networks and the exchange of resources within alliances we expect to deliver further insights into the actual influence of coalitions on policy making (Ingold and Leifeld, 2014; Leifeld, 2013) .
Incomplete data & belief mobilization
With position papers from many different actors available, the approach of identifying policy core beliefs on the basis of written accounts is both promising and feasible. However, even with an essentially nice stock of data it might not always be possible to accurately map the core beliefs of every actor. We came across many instances in which submissions were not long or detailed enough to extract policy core beliefs. In addition, we encountered a systematic challenge as several pro-economy actors made no or just very few statements on environmental or social issues. If an actor does not mobilize a specific belief dimension (e.g. environment) we can assume but do not know for sure that it is not considered important. One way out is to mobilize further sources (e.g. press releases, annual reports, programs of political parties), another would be to work with questionnaires that explicitly try to reveal different dimensions of policy core beliefs (Ingold, 2011 companies that expect to benefit from the transition.
Moreover, it seems that changes in the policy issue also contribute to policy change: Renewable energies meanwhile offer economic opportunities and can be more easily associated with conservative values such as job creation and energy independence. At the same time, nuclear energy has lost some of its former legitimacy and became increasingly expensive, which also provides grounds for re-valuation.
In conceptual terms, these observations can be interpreted as three interrelated processes: (beginning) changes in policy core beliefs, changes in the actor base (e.g. new industries emerging and incumbent actors re-orienting) and changes in the policy issue. Note that the latter process covers both, substantial changes (e.g. technology performance, market size, diffusion rate) and changes in the discourse (e.g. expectations, framing of the technology).
This has implications for policy analysis: In the case of socio-technical transitions, it seems that policy change is not just a matter of changes in policy core beliefs and resource flows. Instead, change of the policy issue (substantive and discursive) and changes in the actor base (substantive) also play a role. This essentially points to the interdependence of policy change and socio-technical change as suggested by our framework.
In conclusion, we think that the ACF represents an interesting complement to the existing concepts for studying socio-technical transitions. With its focus on cognitive processes to explain collaboration and policy change, it seems to be well suited for the study of sustainability transitions, which are characterized by high uncertainties. It also holds promises for future research on the cognitive aspects of contested transitions, e.g. when exploring overlaps with the sociology of expectations (Borup et al., 2006) or discourse theories (Avelino, 2011; Geels and Verhees, 2011) . With its focus on actors and resources, finally, it also mobilizes 29 'material' explanations for policy change, which -in further research -can be linked with resource and strategy based approaches for studying socio-technical transitions (Farla et al., 2012; Musiolik and Markard, 2011) . More generally, research on the politics of transitions opens up an essential as well as highly promising avenue for research in the field of sustainability transitions. • Do you agree that new nuclear power plants cannot be approved any more? Yes/No.
Appendix
• Do you agree with expansion targets for electricity from renewable energies and with targets for energy demand? Yes/No.
• Do you agree that electricity suppliers have to fulfill targets for a steady improvement of energy efficiency (with the use of white certificates)? Yes/No. 
